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Thank you, Mark, for your kind introduction.
The question before the panel today is whether the United States, actions
regarding national security over the last year or so are in harmony with
international law, or, in the alternative, are the United States, policies on a
collision course with international law. The panel introduction mentioned
several issues that can be examined in this light in the wake of 9-11, including
the United States military and intelligence activities in the global war on terror,
indefinite detention of suspected foreign terrorists and the renunciation of the
International Criminal Court ("ICC"). These remarks focus on the latter
issue-United States involvement with the ICC, and we will examine why the
United States, actions toward the ICC have been in compliance with
international law. First, we will begin with a brief background of the history of
the ICC, then we'll identify and discuss the major flaws of the treaty, and then
examine the United States, efforts to deal with the existence of the treaty and its
entry into force.
The ICC was created through the Rome Treaty on July 17th, 1998, and it
entered into force on July 1st of 2002. To date, the treaty has 139 signatories
and 81 state parties. The court is located in the Hague, The Netherlands.
Jurisdiction of the court began on July 1st, 2002, and jurisdiction is not
retroactive. The court is now being constituted and should be operational in the
spring of 2003.
The ICC claims jurisdiction to try war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity. The court also claims jurisdiction to try the "crime of aggression,"
which the treaty has not yet defined. In this regard, one may view the ICC as
related to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of the General Assembly, and as
an effort by the General Assembly to seize a more active role in dealing with
threats to peace and security.
The United States signed the ICC on December 31st, 2000. At the time,
President Clinton said the treaty was "fundamentally flawed," and the President
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would not forward the treaty to the Senate for ratification. President Clinton
also recommended that his successor not do so as well. President G. W. Bush
has acknowledged the same flaws that President Clinton identified, and he also
has not forwarded the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent. On May 6th,
2002, the United States notified the United Nations, and virtually every nation
on the planet by demarche that the United States did not intend to be bound by
the treaty. This "unsigning" of the treaty was consistent with United States
obligations under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which states that a state is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty "until it shall have made its intentions clear not
to become a party to the treaty."
Why did President Clinton announce the treaty was "fundamentally
flawed?" We will introduce some of the major provisions of the treaty that
serve to highlight flaws in the convention.
First, the treaty is a threat to the sovereignty of states. The treaty claims
jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties without their state's consent. This
leads to the problem that Ambassador David Scheffer identified with
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction of the court is both too broad and too
narrow. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23
July 1998, Ambassador David Scheffer set forth one of the United States'
fundamental disagreements with the parameters of the ICC's jurisdiction.
Article 12 of the Statute establishes jurisdiction, absent a Security Council
referral, when either the state on whose territory the crime was committed is a
party or when the accused person's state of nationality is a party. This
jurisdiction is both too broad and too narrow. The jurisdiction is far too narrow
because under Article 12 construction a state could simply stay a n6n-party and
remain outside the reach of the ICC. Thus, the ICC fails to capture perhaps the
leading cause of genocide and mass murder in modem history-governments
killing their own citizens. On this subject, it is useful to make reference to the
work of Professor Rudy Rummel at the University of Hawaii. His research,
which was funded by the United States Institute of Peace, indicates that the
greatest numbers of mass murders in the modem era have been committed by
governments against their own people. His findings indicate that 170 million
people have been murdered by their own governments, aside from war, in recent
memory. Because the ICC purportedly does not apply to non-parties, it
potentially cannot establish jurisdiction over governments that reject the
treaty-potentially leaving the mass human rights crimes of the world's more
heinous leaders untouched by the jurisdiction of the court.
While ICC jurisdiction is too narrow, failing to be able to assert
jurisdiction over the worse genocide and human rights offenders, the
jurisdiction is also overly broad. A non-party, e.g., the United States,
participating in a peacekeeping operation in a state party's territory, could be
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subject to ICC jurisdiction. Moreover, because a non-party cannot opt out of
war crimes jurisdiction for the permitted seven years, its exposure may be even
greater than that of state parties.
Second, serious defects in the treaty threaten United States freedom of
action and expose United States civilian and military leaders, as well as military
servicemen and women, to politically motivated prosecution. The ICC
prosecutors are self-initiating and largely unaccountable. The ICC establishes
an independent prosecutor that has the power to initiate investigations either
referral from either a state party or the United Nations Security Council. There
are inadequate checks and balances on powers of prosecutors and judges to the
ICC. The judges and prosecutors are not responsible to the UN or elected
officials, and a consensus of 2 out of 3 judges can decide to go forward on a
case.
Related to the issue of inadequate checks and balances on the ICC is that
it does not provide the extensive criminal procedure rights and protections
guaranteed in the United States Constitution, such as the right to a trial by jury
and high standards of evidence. As a result, the ICC might fail to recognize a
United States prosecution that ends in an acquittal because of a constitutional
technicality or the requirement that all elements be proved "beyond a reasonable
doubt." The ICC prosecutor is self-initiating, tantamount to a global version of
the domestic independent prosecutor, which has been charged by both
Republicans and Democrats as operating from a politically motivated bias.
Without internal checks and balances on the prosecutor, there is no protection
against politicized prosecutions.
This makes the relationship between the ICC and national judicial
processes uncertain. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC claims the authority to
second guess the actions taken and the results reached by sovereign states with
respect to the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Even in cases in which
the United States has appropriately exercised its responsibilities to investigate
and/or prosecute in a particular case, the ICC prosecutor, with the approval from
a three-judge panel, could still decide to initiate an ICC investigation or
prosecution. Such a decision by the ICC prosecutor is not inconceivable. Many
of the features of the United States common law system diverge from the
European continental approach and other legal systems throughout the world.
An ICC prosecutor may not understand, or may disagree with the operation of
the common law system, including the jury system, constitutional protections
for criminal defendants, and rights of appeal, that are fundamental aspects of the
American system. Reservations to the statute might have been able to address
these issues, but the treaty prohibits state reservations to the treaty. Lacking
important reservations, the treaty is inconsistent with United States law and
establishes a dangerous precedent. Thus, the court's claimed jurisdiction over
nonparties encroaches on United States constitutional safeguards.
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This leads to the fourth problem with the ICC, which is that it dilutes the
role of the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC"), as set forth in the United
Nations Charter. Text excludes a proper and adequate role for the UNSC-
degree of UNSC control over prosecutions. In contrast to the ad hoc tribunals
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia which worked in conjunction with and under the
authorization of the UNSC, the ICC is independent of the UNSC. As an
independent body, it usurps the authority of the Security Council. I would add
that the United States has been a major proponent of these proper international
tribunals. Slobodan Milosevic is on trial for his crimes because a coalition of
nations led by the United States, gave political support and funding to the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The United States has also
provided practical cooperation and assistance to the new leadership in Belgrade
in this regard. The United States also supported the International Criminal
Tribunal in Rwanda, and the American government recently announced a
"Rewards for Justice" program on Central Africa with the goal of bringing to
Arusha the authors of the Rwandan genocide who are still at large.
The vague and ambiguous definitions of crimes are especially susceptible
to abuse. In particular, the undefined "crime of aggression" could extend to
some United States troop deployments, and the alleged crime of "settlement in
an occupied territory", arguably implicates Israeli leaders for activities in the
West Bank and Gaza strip. Traditionally, a crime of aggression is what the
Security Council determines it to be. The current text usurps the UNSC's
authority to define aggression, but paradoxically, the court establishes ICC
jurisdiction over crimes of aggression-all while leaving the definition of
aggression to subsequent amendment.
The current system-based upon the UNSC -- delivers accountability. The
global community is best served by relying on national judicial systems and
international tribunals established where appropriate by the Security Council
within the framework of the United Nations Charter. If someone disagrees with
this arrangement and the involvement of the UNSC, then the solution is not to
create a new mechanism that is at odds with the existing security architecture,
as the ICC is, but to amend the present United Nations Charter.
The United States approach to the ICC has been to seek agreements with
other nations that exempt United States nationals from the jurisdiction of the
treaty. These agreements, authorized by Article 98 of the Rome Treaty, are
fully consistent with and contemplated by the treaty framework. In fact, during
the UNSC debate on protection for peacekeepers from the ICC, countries that
are leading proponents fo the court urged the United States to make use of
Article 98 agreements as a means of addressing American concerns about the
court. It is, then, a bit disingenuous; to now argue that proposing Article 98
agreements somehow undermines the treaty. One more note with regard
specifically to the military. Some proponents of the treaty maintain that the
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existence of bilateral or regional Status of Forces Agreements ("SOFAs")
already provide protection for United States service men and women, and
should be sufficient to address United States concerns. SOFAs typically govern
the status of military forces in a particular partner nation. While criminal
jurisdiction issues within the context of the host nation's laws are dealt with in
SOFAs, there is no inherent conflict in signing an Article 98 agreement.
Moreover, the Article 98 agreements sought by the United States are not limited
to protecting only military and civilian employees of the Department of
Defense, as most SOFAs are, but will protect all United States nationals.
In these few minutes, I have set forth why President Clinton termed the
Rome Treaty "fundamentally flawed," as well as the major reasons why the
United States and other nations have departed from cooperation with the court.
By utilizing the United Nations Charter framework, which has taken fifty years
to evolve and gain acceptance as a mechanism for stabilizing global order, the
United States is preserving national security while strengthening international
legal regimes.
